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Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange
Heinrich H. Nax1
Abstract
In this paper, completely uncoupled dynamics for n-player bargaining are proposed that
mirror key behavioral elements of early bargaining and aspiration adjustment models
(Zeuthen 1930, Sauermann & Selten 1962). Individual adjustment dynamics are based
on directional learning adjustments, solely driven by histories of own realized payoffs.
Bargaining this way, all possible splits have positive probability in the stationary distri-
bution of the process, but players will split the pie almost equally most of the time. The
expected waiting time for almost equal splits to be played is quadratic.
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1. Introduction
Bargaining models are amongst the most important applications of game theory, spanning
cooperative, noncooperative, evolutionary and experimental games. The most basic one
is bilateral bargaining. Indeed, Ellingsen (1997) asks the question: Is there any economic
activity more basic than two people dividing a pie? Dating back to Zeuthen (1930),
Raiffa (1953), Luce & Raiffa (1957), Schelling (1956) and Rubinstein (1982), bilateral
bargaining has been modelled as some kind of “power struggle”. The proposed procedures
mirror adjustments driven by admixtures of patience, threats, and/or rounds of offers and
counteroffers with subsequent compromise.2
In this paper, we focus on infinitely repeated multilateral bargaining in a homogeneous
population that takes place in an informational setting characterized by the absence of
information concerning other players’ utility functions, actions and payoffs. We propose
an evolutionary model of bargaining without information exchange. The game-theoretic
full-rationality canon is of course not germane in such an environment (Young 2004), and
not even standard evolutionary models can be applied (Weibull 1995, Sandholm 2010).
Other than in the dynamic bargaining models of Zeuthen (1930), Raiffa (1953), Luce &
Raiffa (1957), Schelling (1956) and Rubinstein (1982), the pie is not just split once at
the end of the bargaining process but repeatedly each round. Agents repeatedly demand
slices of the pie without information about others’ demands. Agents receive their slices
when demands are globally feasible, but receive nothing when not. Without individuals
going through a process of hypothesis-formation concerning other agents’ actions, the
model that we propose is easy as pie (pun intended):
• an agent whose previous demand was feasible occasionally demands incrementally
more, while an agent whose previous demand was infeasible reduces his demand with
a probability that is increasing in his demand-payoff differential.
Bargaining this way, all possible n-way splits of the pie have positive probability in the
stationary distribution of the process, but players end up sharing the pie almost equally
most of the time. Indeed, from any initial state, an almost equal split is reached in
quadratic time. Equity here refers to players receiving the same (or very similar) payoffs
in the long-run outcomes.3 In our setting, due to the homogeneity of the population, the
multilateral generalizations of the aforementioned, standard bargaining solutions (due to
Zeuthen’s, Nash’s, or Rubinstein’s) all coincide with this allocation. The aim of this
paper is to illustrate another dynamic with which it may be reached, the distinguishing
factor being the informational limits of the environment.
Even though our model of bargaining is evolutionary in a finite population, that is, the
pie is split repeatedly by the same agents, our bargaining dynamics are different from the
2Axiomatic bargaining solutions such as Nash’s (1950) explicitly consider relative bargaining strengths
(“outside options”). Harsanyi (1956) shows that the solutions obtained by Zeuthen’s dynamic model and
Nash’s axiomatization coincide.
3The number of adjustments needed to reach such outcomes may not be the same for all players,
hence there is ground to think of some inequality in terms of bargaining efforts or more general concepts
of social exchange equity (Adams 1965) depending on initial states.
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standard bargaining models of this kind which we shall discuss shortly. In terms of the
underlying dynamic adjustment components, our dynamics have closer antecedents in the
iterative bargaining model of Zeuthen (1930) where the pie is split only once at the end of
the process. In Zeuthen, bargaining starts with both parties demanding the entire pie.4
Over time, bargaining ensues as a sequence of mutual concessions that are based on the
two parties’ relative willingness to risk conflict: at any infeasible intermediate proposal,
the party with the lower willingness to accept breakdown, which (in the symmetric case)
is the party with the higher demand, adjusts its demand to a slightly smaller demand.
Concessions alternate in this way until feasible demands are made.5 Then bargaining
ends. Formally, our dynamics are a probabilistic interpretation of Zeuthen’s model with
repeated consumption of the pie, but the underlying behavioral motivations are also mo-
tivated differently. In Zeuthen, the party with the lower willingness to risk breakdown
concedes precisely because she judges her opponent’s willingness to risk breakdown to
be higher (probably by interpretation of her past actions). By contrast, our model as-
sumes that demand concessions are triggered by own demand-payoff differentials and past
experiences, without hypotheses made about others.
Our individual adjustment dynamics do not rely on information about others. Instead,
decisions are solely based on the histories of own realized payoffs. This means that our
dynamics are “completely uncoupled” (Foster & Young 2006, Young 2009) from others’
actions and payoffs. “Completely uncoupled” learning tightens the informational con-
straints of “uncoupled” learning (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2003, 2006), which may depend on
others’ past actions.6 Completely uncoupled rules have recently been applied to nonco-
operative games by Karandikar et al. (1998), Foster & Young (2006), Germano & Lugosi
(2007), Young (2009), Marden et al. (2011), Pradelski & Young (2012), Babichenko
(2012), Marden et al. (2014), and to cooperative games and matching models by Nax
(2011), Nax et al. (2013). These models have antecedents in classic learning theory
dating back to Thorndike (1898), Hoppe (1931), Estes (1950), Heckhausen (1955), Her-
rnstein (1961) and Sauermann & Selten (1962). Reinforcement learning models (Bush &
Mosteller 1955, Suppes & Atkinson 1959, Harley 1981, Cross 1983, Roth & Erev 1995,
Erev & Roth 1998) are a particularly famous class of completely uncoupled learning
dynamics.
Our dynamics are most closely related to the theory of aspiration adjustment due to
Heckhausen (1955) and Sauermann & Selten (1962). The particular learning heuristic
we adopt is based on “directional learning” (Selten & Stoecker 1986, Selten & Buchta
1998). According to the directional learning hypothesis of bargaining, agents demand
either more or less dependent on whether previous demands were successful or not. This
hypothesis was tested extensively in (bilateral) experiments by scientists surrounding the
4Other iterative bargaining procedures such as Raiffa (1953), Luce & Raiffa (1957), Kalai (1977),
John & Raith (1999) start from inside the bargaining set. The differences between these approaches and
ours is similar in spirit to the differences with Zeuthen that are discussed in detail here.
5In Raiffa (1953), Luce & Raiffa (1957), Kalai (1977), John & Raith (1999), the process moves the
other way around and iterative steps towards the Pareto frontier are negotiated.
6See Babichenko (2010, 2012) for convergence comparisons of uncoupled and completely uncoupled
dynamics.
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theory’s main proponents at the time (e.g. Tietz et al., 1978).7 In fact, we could restate
our adjustment dynamics with their words (Tietz et al. 1978; pp. 91, 94):
• “the basis of the aspiration levels changes according to the economic situation and
is modified by success and failure in the previous negotiation.”
• “a subject lowers his aspiration level after a negative impulse. It is not lowered if
the impulse is positive. After a neutral impulse the aspiration level is kept stable.”
• “a subject raises his aspiration level after a positive impulse. It is not raised if the
impulse is negative. After a neutral impulse the aspiration level is kept stable.”
What is new about our take on directional learning is our re-interpretation as a completely
uncoupled dynamic. In the standard formulation (see, for example, Grosskopf 2003),
players learn directionally because they have knowledge of counterfactuals, that is, they
can assess how strategies in either direction would have performed relative to the strategy
that was actually chosen. Here, we do not require such knowledge. Instead, directionality
is born from the fact that players have a tendency to demand more (less) when currently
receiving a payoff that matches or exceeds (falls short of) their aspirations. A similar
approach has recently been taken by Nax et al. (2013), Nax and Perc (2015), Nax and
Pradelski (2015), and Burton-Chellew et al. (2015).
A particular feature of these dynamics is that, after a negative impulse, an agent reduces
his demand with a probability that is increasing in his demand-payoff differential. This
is a phenomenon observed regularly in the aforementioned experiments (e.g. Tietz et al.
1978). More recently, experiments by Ding & Nicklisch (2013), Nax et al. (2013), Burton-
Chellew et al. (2015) also provide non-bargaining evidence for this phenomenon. Nax et
al. (2015), for example, consider the context of voluntary contributions games played in
an experimental setting where information is neither revealed about the structure of the
game nor about other players’ actions and payoffs. The predominant type of adjustments
identified in their study is directional in our sense, and indeed much more accentuated
after negative stimuli than after positive ones. This finding is confirmed in Burton-
Chellew et al. (2015), and indeed found to be a robust feature even in environments
where more information is available and against competing hypotheses.8 This suggests
that negative stimuli regularly have a more immediate effect than positive stimuli, the
impact of which depends on the size of the shock. This feature of our dynamic, more
generally, relates to asymmetric reactions to perceived gains and losses that also lie at the
heart of several of the recently proposed completely uncoupled, trial-and-error learning
models (in particular, in Young 2009, Marden et al. 2011, Pradelski & Young 2012).
As mentioned previously, the differences between our approach and traditional evolution-
ary bargaining models, as for example in Young (1993), Ellingsen (1997), Alexander &
Skyrms (1999), Saez-Marti & Weibull (1999), Binmore et al. (2003), are substantial in
7See also Tietz & Weber (1972), Tietz (1975), Weber (1976), Tietz et al. (1978), Tietz & Bartos
(1983), Cro¨ssmann & Tietz (1983), Tietz et al. (1988). Roth (1995) discusses subsequent experiments.
8Actually, such directional adjustments may turn out to be strategically rationalizable in these higher
information environments. (I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.)
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terms of their behavioral and informational assumptions.9 Take Young’s (1993) model,
for instance, where random pairs of agents from finite populations are repeatedly drawn
to play the Nash demand game. Each player in such an interaction randomly samples
demands from previous bargaining encounters and plays a best reply to his sample with
high probability, but there is small probability of “noise”, that is, players commit er-
rors with small probability. The analysis of “stochastic stability” (Foster & Young 1990,
Young 1993) reveals which bargaining outcomes are long-run stable as the “noise” rate
goes to zero in such a dynamic.10 Under some regularity assumptions, stochastic stability
analysis reveals that the population evolves to play of the Nash bargaining solution. By
contrast, our model is not based on best-reply dynamics, and its implicit noise rates do
not diminish. Hence, we formally do not use the concept of stochastic stability, but a
zonal notion of convergence instead.11 Indeed, agents do not reply to others because they
have no information about them. Instead, agents adjust their behavior based on own
experience and continue to experiment with their own actions at fixed rates ad infinitum.
In this paper, we propose an intuitive model motivated by experimental evidence as to
how this is done and explore its convergence properties.
The paper is structured as follows. Next, we introduce the model’s static and dy-
namic components. Section 3 contains the paper’s convergence results. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2. The model
2.1. Static components
The following n-player extension of the Nash demand game is played.
n-player cooperative transferable-utility bargaining. A fixed population of players,
N = {1, ..., n}, bargains over the unit pie. G(v,N) is the cooperative bargaining game with
characteristic function v : 2n → R such that subcoalitions are inessential (v(S) = v(∅) =
0 for all S ⊂ N), and the grand coalition produces the unit pie (i.e. v(N) = 1).
Demands. Each player i ∈ N makes a demand di ∈ [0, 1] of the unit pie. We assume
that, for some k ∈ N+, each di is a multiple of some discrete stepsize δ = 1/nk. Write
d = {d1, ..., dn} for a demand vector, and Ω for the (finite) set of possible demand
vectors.
Payoffs. If demands are jointly feasible, each player receives his demand; otherwise,
9See also Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), Konrad & Morath (2015) for evolutionary models
of “ultimatum bargaining” (Gu¨th et al. 1982), or Binmore et al. (1998) for an evolutionary analysis of
alternating-offer “Rubinstein bargaining” (Rubinstein 1982).
10“Stochastic stability” is an equilibrium refinement that is different from “evolutionary stability”
based on replicator arguments (Maynard Smith & Price 1973, Maynard Smith 1974) or from “evolution-
ary stability” in finite populations (Schaffer 1988, Nowak et al. 2004).
11The difference between these convergence concepts is addressed in more detail in Young (2009), see
also Babichenko (2012)
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individuals receive zero. For any player i ∈ N at any time t, his payoff is
φi =
{
di if
∑
i∈N di ≤ 1,
0 otherwise.
Write φ for a vector of payoffs {φ1, ..., φn}.
2.2. Dynamic components
The process moves in infinite continuous time. Players are “activated” by independent
Poisson clocks at rate one.12 Define a “time step” t by activation of a unique agent, the
uniqueness of which is given by the independence of the Poisson clocks. A new bargaining
game is played every time a new time step t begins.
Let dt describe agents’ demands at time t. For all j 6= i not activated at time t + 1, j
remains inactive and continues with his previous demand dt+1j = d
t
j. For the activated
agent, we assume the following demand adjustments. Recall that agents crucially have
no information about other agents’ demands or payoffs.
Increases. If
∑
j∈N d
t
j ≤ 1, then, if dti < 1,
dt+1i =
{
dti + δ with probability r,
dti otherwise.
(1)
We assume that r ∈ (0, 1), subsequently referred to as the rate of experimentation, is
constant. If
∑
j∈N d
t
j ≤ 1 and dti = 1, then we assume dt+1i = dti with probability
one.
Reductions. If
∑
j∈N d
t
j > 1, then
dt+1i =
{
dti with probability s(d
t
i),
dti − δ otherwise. (2)
We assume s(·), subsequently referred to as the degree of stickiness, to be a time-invariant
linear function, constant for all players, and of the form 1− s(dti) = adti with 0 < a < 1.13
For convenience, we shall define f(·) = 1 − s(·). Notice that dt+1i = dti with probability
one if dti = 0. Furthermore, in line with the empirical observation mentioned in the
introduction that agents react stronger to negative than to positive stimuli, we shall
assume that r < aδ, i.e. that any reduction is more likely than an increase.14
12It will be convenient to have set up the process with these Poisson clocks when we turn to convergence
times. For the meantime, it is also possible to think of agents being activated uniformly at random in
discrete time.
13The linear function is an approximation for more general functions or a lower bound for functions
that first-order dominate the linear bound (e.g. more convex or step functions). Using adi with a =
f(δ)
δ
for any convex function f(·) with f(0) = 0, f ′(x) > 0 and f ′′(x) ≥ 0 for all x > 0, for example,
“understates” the stickiness and works in the opposite direction in terms of our results.
14Assuming r < aδ guarantees that this assumption holds for any current dti > 0 of any player.
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3. Analysis
3.1. Recurrence class
The state of the process at any time t is described by dt, which implies time-t utilities for
all players and also the probabilities for the time-(t+ 1) Markov transitions (expressions
1 and 2), thus yielding a Markov chain on Ω. In this section, we shall show that all
states with less than efficient demands and all states with demands that are infeasible by
more than δ are transient, all other states are recurrent. We shall refer to state d′ as a
neighbor of any given state d if d′ is reached with positive probability in period t + 1 if
the period-t state is d.
Definitions. A state d ∈ Ω is transient if, given dt = d at any time t, there exists a
positive probability that the process never returns to d at any time t′ > t. State d is
recurrent if it is not transient.
Proposition 1. Any state d ∈ Ω with ∑i∈N di < 1 or > 1 + δ is transient. All states
d ∈ Ω with ∑i∈N di ∈ [1, 1 + δ] are recurrent.
Proof of proposition 1. Transience: At t, suppose dt is such that
∑
i∈N d
t
i ≤ 1. Starting
at dt, the process exits with a positive probability in an “outwards” direction (to larger
demands), but not “inwards” (to smaller demands). The direct neighbors of all states with∑
i∈N d
t
i < 1 have
∑
i∈N d
t
i ≤
∑
i∈N d
t+1
i ≤ 1, the states on the frontier with
∑
i∈N d
t
i = 1
have neighbors with 1 ≤∑i∈N dt+1i ≤ 1 + δ.
At t, suppose dt is such that
∑
i∈N d
t
i > 1. Starting at d
t, the process exits with a
positive probability in an inwards direction, but not outwards. The direct neighbors of
all states with
∑
i∈N d
t
i > 1 + δ have
∑
i∈N d
t
i ≥
∑
i∈N d
t+1
i > 1, whereas a state with∑
i∈N d
t
i = 1 + δ is the neighbor of states with 1 ≤
∑
i∈N d
t+1
i ≤ 1 + δ.
Jointly, these observations imply that all states d with
∑
i∈N di < 1 (and
∑
i∈N di > 1+δ)
are transient because the process exits these states with a positive probability in an
outward (inward) direction but, once left, they are never again reached.
Recurrence: Any recurrent state d is such that
∑
j∈N dj ∈ [1, 1 + δ].
Claim. There exist positive-probability transitions between any two recurrent states d,
d′.
The claim follows directly from the following two observations.
• given dt = d with ∑i∈N di = 1, the probability that dt+1i = dti + δ for any i ∈ N
and dt+1j = d
t
j for all j 6= i is r/n > 0 if dti < 1.
• given dt = d with ∑i∈N di = 1 + δ, the probability that dt+1i = dti− δ for any i ∈ N
and dt+1j = d
t
j for all j 6= i is at least aδ/n > 0 if dti > 0.
The two transitions can be used to reallocate any number of δs from any player demanding
a positive amount, via any player, to any player demanding less than one in all d ∈ Ω:∑
i∈N di ∈ [1, 1 + δ].
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3.2. Embedded Pareto frontier chain
Denote by Ωe ⊂ Ω the states on the embedded chain of states d on the Pareto frontier
(with
∑
i∈N di = 1). d
′ is a neighbor of any given state d in this chain if there exists a
state d′′ not in the embedded chain such that, in the original chain, d′′ is a neighbor of
d, and d′ is a neighbor of d′′ (i.e. d′ is reachable from d in two time steps in the original
chain). Recall that all states in Ωe are recurrent (proposition 1). Moreover, given any
state d = (d1, ..., dn), his neighbors dij are of the form (d1, ..., di + δ, ...., dj − δ, ..., dn):
i.e. between neighbouring states, d and dij, in Ω
e a single transfer takes place; first some
player i increases his demand to di + δ (causing infeasibility), then some player j 6= i
(demanding > 0) reduces his demand to dj − δ (restoring feasibility); all other demands
remain at their previous levels. The probability of any feasible transition between any
two neighbors, d and dij, in Ω
e is
piddij =
1
n
r · 1
n
f(dj). (3)
We will view these transitions in Ωe as single time steps indicated by times with hats
( t̂ = 1̂, 2̂, ... ). Note that these take at least two time steps in Ω but may take longer if,
for example, an agent demanding one is drawn on the Pareto frontier, an agent demanding
zero is drawn above the Pareto frontier, etc.
3.3. Equity
Next, we shall prove that almost equal splits will be played most of the time.
Before we turn to the mathematical results, let us state the basic intuition behind this
result which is best-illustrated in bilateral bargaining. (Figure 1 illustrates.) The reader
should note, however, that despite the fact that bilateral bargaining is a useful (graphic)
illustration of our dynamics, the same arguments do not carry over trivially to multilateral
bargaining.
Suppose two players bargain over the unit-pie. If d1 + d2 ≤ 1, both players receive the
shares they respectively demand. At the next time step, both players are equally likely
to increase their demand by δ if both demand less than one. If d1 + d2 > 1, both players
receive zero. At the next time step, the player currently demanding a higher share of the
pie is more likely to reduce. Eventually (by proposition 1), this increase-decrease dynamic
will boil down to an ongoing process that moves on (or one δ above) the Pareto frontier;
again and again, one of two transitions occur: (i) one of the two players overshoots the
Pareto frontier by δ; then (ii) one of the two players (more likely the one with the higher
demand) reduces by δ. Over time, this leads to equal splits.
3.4. Equity drift
To prove convergence, we track the variance of demands in the embedded chain Ωe. Note
that, in the recurrent class, payoffs equal demands if demands are feasible, and payoffs
are zero when demands are infeasible. The variance of payoffs, too, is therefore equal to
8
Figure 1: Bilateral bargaining with linear boundary of slope -1.
Figure 1: The bargaining process takes place above zero. States below the Pareto fron-
tier are transient, expected movement is outwards along 45-degree rays towards the
Pareto frontier. In the external region, the process tends inwards and towards equal
surplus splits. In the long run, the process moves between states with sums of de-
mands equal to one (fat diagonal) and exterior states with sums of demands equal to
1 + δ (dashed diagonal). The zigzag in the exterior region highlights possible nego-
tiation paths in Zeuthen’s model. Long-run mass concentrates around equal surplus
splits.
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the variance of demands if demands are feasible, and equal to zero when demands are
infeasible.
Variance. Given any state d ∈ Ω, the variance of demands is V ar(d) = 1
n
∑
i∈N(di−µ)2
where µ = 1
n
∑
i∈N di =
1
n
is the constant mean payoff in Ωe. Write ∆(V ar(dt̂+1)) =
V ar(dt̂+1)− V ar(dt̂) for the change in variance between times t̂ and t̂+ 1 in Ωe.
Variance drift.
Given any state dt̂ = d at time t̂ such that d ∈ Ωe, we shall refer to E[∆(V ar(dt̂+1))|dt̂ =
d] as the variance drift.
If E[∆(V ar(dt̂+1))|dt̂ = d] < 0, there is an “equity-drift”, that is, the variance of demands
in Ωe diminishes in expectation.
Lemma 2. Starting with dt̂ = d ∈ Ωe, the variance drift is
E[∆(V ar(dt̂+1))|dt̂ = d] = 2arδ
[
δ
n− 1
n2
− V ar(d)
]
. (4)
Proof of lemma 2. From any state d ∈ Ωe, we move to a given dij 6= d ∈ Ωe with
probability rf(dj)
1
n2
which is positive if dj > 0. In the original chain, we leave d in one
time step and come back to d in the next with probability
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i rf(dj)
1
n2
. Hence,
with probability 1−∑i∈N∑j 6=i rf(dj) 1n2 , we stay in d in Ωe. The next expected sum of
squares of demands in Ωe is therefore
E[
∑
i∈N(d
t̂+1
i )
2|dt̂ = d] =
r
n2
∑
i{
∑
j 6=i f(dj)([di + δ]
2 + [dj − δ]2 +
∑
k 6=i,j d
2
k)}+ (1−
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i rf(dj)
1
n2
)
∑
i d
2
i .
Expanding the squares, this becomes
r
n2
∑
i{
∑
j 6=i f(dj)(
∑
k d
2
k + 2δ
2 + 2δ[di − dj])}+ (1−
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i rf(dj)
1
n2
)
∑
i d
2
i ,
which is
∑
i d
2
i + 2δr
1
n
∑
i f(di)[
n−1
n
δ − (
∑
i f(di)di∑
i f(di)
−
∑
i di
n
)].
Substituting f(di) = adi in the above equation, the drift in the sum of squares of demands
is
E[∆(
∑
i∈N(d
t̂+1
i )
2)|dt̂ = d] =
2arδ
n
∑
i di[δ
n−1
n
− (
∑
i d
2
i∑
i di
−
∑
i di
n
)] = 2arδ
∑
i di[δ
n−1
n2
− V ar(d)],
which is also the drift in the variance as
∑
j∈N dj = 1 for all d ∈ Ωe.
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Note that the variance drift in Ωe is negative if, and only if,
V ar(d) > δ
n− 1
n2
. (5)
Furthermore, when V ar(d) < δ n−1
n2
, any change in Ωe in a single time step is at most
δ2 n−1
n2
(which occurs when V ar(d) = 0).15
3.5. Results
Theorem 3. For any small β > 0 and for any large probability 1 − γ < 1, there exists
a step size δ ≤ βγ
3
and a time Tδ such that the variance of payoffs is less than β at least
1− γ of the time after Tδ.
Proof of theorem 3. First, we shall prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. From any state d ∈ Ωe, for any bargaining game with step size δ > 0, there
exists a time Tδ such that, for every t > Tδ, relative inequity as measured by the variance
of payoffs will in expectation be less than 2δ.
Proof of lemma 4. It follows from proposition 1 that convergence of the process can be
analyzed using the embedded chain Ωe. Remember that, in Ωe, payoffs and demands
coincide, and recall that we move in Ωe in times t̂.
We prove this theorem in two steps. First, we prove that, from any state d ∈ Ωe with
V ar(d) ≤ 2δ, all expected future variances are less than 2δ, and that, from any state
d ∈ Ωe with V ar(d) > 2δ, all expected future variances are less than V ar(d). Second,
we prove that, for any initial state d0 ∈ Ωe, it takes at most time T̂ for the expected
variance to be less than 2δ. Jointly, these two facts imply that, starting anywhere in Ωe,
E[V ar(dt̂)|d0] ≤ 2δ after time T̂ .
Step 1. Expression 4 is negative for all states dT̂ = d ∈ Ωe with V ar(d) > δ n−1
n2
(lemma
2). If dT̂ = d is such that V ar(d) ≤ δ n−1
n2
< δ, a maximum ∆(V ar(dT̂+1)) = δ2 n−1
n2
< δ
may occur at the next time step and, thus, result in a V ar(dT̂+1) no larger than 2δ.
Hence, for any state d with V ar(d) > 2δ, it is true that, for all t̂′ > t̂,
E[V ar(dt̂′)|dt̂ = d] < V ar(d); (6)
and, for any state d with V ar(d) ≤ 2δ,
E[V ar(dt̂′)|dt̂ = d] < 2δ. (7)
Step 2. We now prove that there exists a time T̂ < ∞ such that E[V ar(dt̂)|d0] ≤ 2δ
indeed holds for all t̂ > T̂ from any starting state d0 in Ωe. Note that, for any time t̂
15Note that we may drop 2ar from this last expression because 2ar < 2r < 2δ < 1.
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and for any state dt̂ = d with V ar(d) = 2δ, we know that E[∆(V ar(dt̂+1))|dt̂ = d] < 0.
Hence, for any state d with V ar(d) > 2δ, the drift can be bound by E[∆(V ar(dt̂+1))|dt̂ =
d] = 2arδ
n
[δ n−1
n
− V ar(d)] < −2arδ2 n+1
n2
. Writing c ≡ 2arδ2 n+1
n2
, we obtain the expression
E[V ar(dt̂+1)|dt̂ = d] ≤ V ar(d)− c (8)
for any d ∈ Ωe with V ar(d) > 2δ. Iteratively applying equation 8 as long as the variance
exceeds 2δ yields, from any starting state d0 ∈ Ωe,
E[V ar(dt̂)|d0] = E[E[V ar(dt̂)|dt̂−1]|d0] (9)
≤ max{E[V ar(dt̂−1)− c|d0], 2δ}.
As long as E[V ar(dt̂−1)−c|d0] > 2δ, we iterate expression 9 repeatedly forward to obtain
E[V ar(dt̂)|d0] ≤ max{V ar(d0)− ct̂; 2δ}, (10)
which is less than or equal to 2δ for every t̂ > T̂δ when T̂δ ≥ 1c (1 − 2δ) ≥ 1c (V ar(d0) −
2δ).
Now we can prove theorem 3.
For any β ∈ (0, 1] and starting at any d0 ∈ Ωe, lemma 4 implies that, for any t̂ > T̂δ,
P([V ar(dt̂|d0] ≥ β) · β + P([V ar(dt̂)|d0] < β) · 0 ≤ E[V ar(dt̂)|d0].
Rearranged, for any d0 ∈ Ωe, it holds for any β > 0 and γ > 0, that (yielding the Markov
inequality)
P([V ar(dt̂)|d0] ≥ β) ≤ E[V ar(d
t̂)|d0]
β
≤ 2δ
β
≤ γ, (11)
by appropriate choices of δ ≤ βγ
2
and this occurs after time
t̂ > T̂δ ≥ 1
c
(1− 2δ). (12)
From any state d /∈ Ωe with ∑i∈N di < 1, E[∑i∈N dti] ≥ 1 after
t > T ′δ =
1
rδ
. (13)
For any state d /∈ Ωe with ∑i∈N di > 1, E[∑i∈N dti] ≤ 1 + δ after
t > T ′′δ =
n2
aδ
(14)
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Starting at any state d0 ∈ Ω, expression 11 therefore generalizes to
P([V ar(dt) + |
∑
i∈N
dti − 1| |d0] ≥ β) ≤
E[V ar(dt) + |∑i∈N dti − 1| |d0]
β
≤ 3δ
β
≤ γ, (15)
which holds for any β > 0 and γ > 0 by appropriate choices of δ ≤ βγ
3
and by adjustment
for time; for all
t > Tδ ≥ n
arδ
T̂δ + T
′
δ + T
′′
δ . (16)
Corollary 5. The expected waiting time until theorem 3 holds, Tδ, is of order n
2.
Proof of corollary 5. Expression 16 gives the expected waiting time for theorem 3:
Tβ,γ,δ =
1
rδ
+
n2
aδ
+
n2
2a2r2δ3
(1− 2δ). (17)
The first term in 17, 1
rδ
, follows from equation 13, which gives the maximal expected
waiting time to reach a state in Ωe from any state in Ω with
∑
i∈N di < 1. In particular,
this is the expected waiting time to reach the Pareto frontier starting at d: di = 0 for all
i.
The second term, n
2
aδ
, follows from equation 14, which gives the maximal expected waiting
time to reach a state in Ωe from any state in Ω with
∑
i∈N di > 1. In particular, this is
the expected waiting time to reach the Pareto frontier starting d: di = 1 + δ for all i.
The third term follows from equation 12, which gives the maximal expected waiting time
to reach a state in Ωe with V ar(d) < 2δ from any state in Ωe, corrected by the maximal
expected waiting time in between any two states in Ωe. The correction includes one 1/r
for the expected time spent on the Pareto frontier and another n/aδ for the maximal
expected time spent one δ off the Pareto frontier until the next reduction occurs.
Jointly, this implies that Tβ,γ,δ ∈ O(n2).
Note that the respective average times spent with feasible (infeasible) demands are 1/r
(n/a).
4. Conclusion
Zeuthen (1930) formulates a mechanistic bilateral negotiation protocol that mirrors be-
havioral elements of adjustments. In his model, adjustments were attributable to common
knowledge about players’ relative willingness to concede or to risk conflict. We propose a
related dynamic based on aspiration adjustment theory and experimental evidence from
directional learning for the case of a homogeneous bargaining population. Importantly,
we assume that agents have information only about their own demands and payoffs but
not about those of others. We have proposed a model that incorporates the underlying
13
revision procedures in a fully dynamic n-player bargaining model. In Zeuthen, the key
assumption regarding individual adjustments is that, starting from infeasible demands,
the party which currently holds the higher demand incrementally reduces with probabil-
ity one. This coincides with a deterministic description of our model. We assume that,
during bargaining breakdown, players with higher utility loss reduce with larger prob-
abilities than players with smaller utility loss. But, instead of consuming the pie only
once, our bargaining game is infinitely repeated. Over time, the procedures implement
equal splits of the surplus in a zonal rather than pinpoint way: using Brems’s (1976; p.
404) famous words on Zeuthen’s bargaining model to describe the final convergent area
as an
• “area around the middle in which no party is substantially more eager to secure
an agreement than the other. Establishing the existence of such centripetal forces -
powerful around the edges of the bargaining area but weaker towards the middle.”
Avenues for further research include multilateral bargaining experiments in the labora-
tory, building on the classic bargaining experiments by Tietz and Weber and on more
recent non-bargaining experiments in low-information environments such as Bayer et al.
(2013), Nax et al. (2013), Burton-Chellew et al. (2015). We are particularly interested
in the speed with which convergence occurs, and the conditions under which such simple
directional bargaining dynamics apply.
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